Arbeitspapier

Truth-Seeking Judgment Aggregation over Interconnected Issues

This paper analyses the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple interconnected issues. We enrich the model by introducing the private information underlying individuals' judgments. Individuals share a common preference for reaching true collective judgments, but hold private information about what the truth might be. Information conflicts may occur both between and within individuals. Assuming strategic voting in a Bayesian voting game setting, we determine the voting rules which lead to collective judgments that efficiently incorporate all private information. We characterize the (rare) situations in which such rules exist, as well as the nature of these rules.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2012:31

Classification
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Subject
judgment aggregation
private information
efficient information aggregation
strategic voting

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bozbay, Irem
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
(where)
Lund
(when)
2012

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Bozbay, Irem
  • Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2012

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