Arbeitspapier
Truth-Seeking Judgment Aggregation over Interconnected Issues
This paper analyses the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple interconnected issues. We enrich the model by introducing the private information underlying individuals' judgments. Individuals share a common preference for reaching true collective judgments, but hold private information about what the truth might be. Information conflicts may occur both between and within individuals. Assuming strategic voting in a Bayesian voting game setting, we determine the voting rules which lead to collective judgments that efficiently incorporate all private information. We characterize the (rare) situations in which such rules exist, as well as the nature of these rules.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2012:31
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Thema
-
judgment aggregation
private information
efficient information aggregation
strategic voting
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bozbay, Irem
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Lund
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bozbay, Irem
- Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2012