Arbeitspapier
Truth-Seeking Judgment Aggregation over Interconnected Issues
This paper analyses the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple interconnected issues. We enrich the model by introducing the private information underlying individuals' judgments. Individuals share a common preference for reaching true collective judgments, but hold private information about what the truth might be. Information conflicts may occur both between and within individuals. Assuming strategic voting in a Bayesian voting game setting, we determine the voting rules which lead to collective judgments that efficiently incorporate all private information. We characterize the (rare) situations in which such rules exist, as well as the nature of these rules.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2012:31
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Subject
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judgment aggregation
private information
efficient information aggregation
strategic voting
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Bozbay, Irem
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Lund
- (when)
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2012
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Bozbay, Irem
- Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2012