Arbeitspapier

Truth-Seeking Judgment Aggregation over Interconnected Issues

This paper analyses the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple interconnected issues. We enrich the model by introducing the private information underlying individuals' judgments. Individuals share a common preference for reaching true collective judgments, but hold private information about what the truth might be. Information conflicts may occur both between and within individuals. Assuming strategic voting in a Bayesian voting game setting, we determine the voting rules which lead to collective judgments that efficiently incorporate all private information. We characterize the (rare) situations in which such rules exist, as well as the nature of these rules.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2012:31

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Thema
judgment aggregation
private information
efficient information aggregation
strategic voting

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bozbay, Irem
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
(wo)
Lund
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bozbay, Irem
  • Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2012

Ähnliche Objekte (12)