Arbeitspapier
Information design in multi-stage games
We consider multi-stage games, where at each stage, players receive private signals about past and current states, past actions and past signals, and choose actions. We fully characterize the distributions over actions, states, and signals that obtain in any (sequential) communication equilibrium of any expansion of multi-stage games, i.e., when players can receive additional signals about past and current states, past actions, and past and current signals (including the additional past signals). We interpret our results as revelation principles for information design problems. We apply our characterization to bilateral bargaining problems.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 861
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
multi-stage games
information design
communication equilibrium
sequential communication equilibrium
information structures
Bayes correlated equilibrium
revelation principle
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Makris, Miltiadis
Renou, Ludovic
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
- (wo)
-
London
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Makris, Miltiadis
- Renou, Ludovic
- Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
Entstanden
- 2018
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