Cooperation and punishment under uncertain enforcement

Arbeitspapier

This paper investigates the efficacy of a punishment mechanism in promoting cooperative behaviour in a public goods game when enforcement of punishment is uncertain. Experimental studies have found that a sanctioning system can induce individuals to adopt behaviour deemed as socially acceptable. Yet, our experiment shows that a sanctioning system cannot promote cooperative behaviour if enforcement is a low-probability event and free-riding behaviour is not often punished. This supports the view that punishment needs to be exercised to be feared, otherwise the simple threat of it cannot be effective in promoting cooperation.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2010-06

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; Public Goods
• Subject: uncertain enforcement ; public good game ; altruistic punishment ; decisionmaking under uncertainty ; cooperation ; Öffentliches Gut ; Verhaltensökonomik ; Kooperation ; Altruismus ; Strafe

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Sousa, Sergio
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
• (where): Nottingham
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49677
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET