Arbeitspapier

Counter Intuitive Results in a Simple Model of Wage Negotiations

Short-term contracts and exogenous productivity growth are introduced in asimple wage bargaining model. The equilibrium utilities corresponding tomilitant union behaviour are independent of the contract length. The wagedynamics are linear if strike is credible (low wage shares) and nonlinearotherwise (high wage shares). The model can admit two steady state wageshares. The one under strike is not credible exceeds the one under strikeis credible. A wage decrease can occur if strike is credible, but neverwhen strike is not credible. In the limit as time between bargaining roundsvanishes only the first paradox survives.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 98-115/3

Classification
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining: General
Subject
wage bargaining
wage dynamics
chaos
strike
Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes
Produktivität
Arbeitskampf
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Houba, Harold
van Lomwel, Gijsbert
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
1998

Handle
Last update
12.07.2022, 12:44 PM CEST

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Houba, Harold
  • van Lomwel, Gijsbert
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 1998

Other Objects (12)