Technology Adoption, Social Learning, and Economic Policy

Arbeitspapier

We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. When the public information is sufficiently high and a social planer therefore expects an investment boom, investments should be taxed. Conversely, any positive investment tax is suboptimally high if the public information is sufficiently unfavorable.We also show that an investment tax may increase overall investment activity.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 306

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Externalities ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Thema: Information Externality ; Strategic Waiting ; Delay ; Information Cascade ; Investment Boom ; Optimal Taxation ; Innovationswettbewerb ; Informationsverbreitung ; Externer Effekt ; Betriebliche Investitionstheorie ; Optimale Besteuerung

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Heidhues, Paul ; Melissas, Nicolas
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13248
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94040
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13248-7
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ