Arbeitspapier
The Picketty inequality in the Nash-Bargained social contract
As a proxy for a Pareto-efficient market economy, we adopt the two-party Nash Bargaining model featuring a qualitative bias in the treatment of the contributions of the parties. The Piketty inequality here is the share in total welfare accruing to the richer party over total welfare attained at agreement point. We show that this inequality can never exceed the inequality in initial contributions if the qualitative bias is zero. The rising Piketty inequality requires that the qualitative bias exceed a positive threshold. The Piketty trajectory emerges if the qualitative bias oscillates around the threshold due to changing social and economic environment.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: UPSE Discussion Paper ; No. 2014-13
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Thema
-
Piketty
Inequality
Nash Bargaining
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fabella, Raul V.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of the Philippines, School of Economics (UPSE)
- (wo)
-
Quezon City
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fabella, Raul V.
- University of the Philippines, School of Economics (UPSE)
Entstanden
- 2014
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