Arbeitspapier

Strategic Reserves versus Market-wide Capacity Mechanisms

Many electricity markets use capacity mechanisms to support generation owners. Capacity payments can mitigate imperfections associated with "missing money" in the spot market and solve transitory capacity shortages caused by investment cycles, regulatory changes, or technology shifts. We discuss capacity mechanisms used in different electricity markets around the world. We argue that strategic reserves, if correctly designed, are likely to be more efficient than market-wide capacity mechanisms. This is especially so in electricity markets that rely on substantial amounts of intermittent generation, hydro power, and energy storage whose available capacity varies with circumstances and is difficult to estimate.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 1387

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Intertemporal Firm Choice: Investment, Capacity, and Financing
Market Design
Energy: General
Energy: Government Policy
Thema
Capacity mechanism
Market design
Reliability
Resource efficiency

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Holmberg, Pär
Tangerås, Thomas P.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2021

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Holmberg, Pär
  • Tangerås, Thomas P.
  • Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Entstanden

  • 2021

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