Arbeitspapier
Cooperation as a Result of Learning with Aspiration Levels
It is shown that a win-stay, lose-hift behavior rule with endogenous aspiration levels yields cooperation in a certain class of games. The aspiration level in each round equals the current population average. The class of games includes the prisoner's dilemma and Cournot oligopoly and thus yields an explanation for cooperation and collusion.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 8/2001
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Subject
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cooperation
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Oechssler, Jörg
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
- (where)
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Bonn
- (when)
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2001
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Oechssler, Jörg
- University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Time of origin
- 2001