Arbeitspapier

Cooperation as a Result of Learning with Aspiration Levels

It is shown that a win-stay, lose-hift behavior rule with endogenous aspiration levels yields cooperation in a certain class of games. The aspiration level in each round equals the current population average. The class of games includes the prisoner's dilemma and Cournot oligopoly and thus yields an explanation for cooperation and collusion.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 8/2001

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Subject
cooperation

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Oechssler, Jörg
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2001

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Oechssler, Jörg
  • University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Time of origin

  • 2001

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