The price of media capture and the looting of newspapers in interwar France

Arbeitspapier

This paper develops a new insight enabling the empirical study of media capture: minority shareholders of newspapers and readers face similar risks. Both are adversely affected when corrupt insiders use the newspaper for personal profit and receive invisible revenues. This means that relevant data on influence and exploitation of newspaper has been hiding in plain sight in stock exchange or over-the-counter prices, since stock transactions reflect the value of this capture. Empirical data is consistent with increasing levels of looting in France during the 1930s. We provide a comparison with Britain and argue that Britain managed to protect its newspapers better.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Working Paper ; No. 09/2012

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance ; Entertainment; Media ; Economic History: Financial Markets and Institutions: Europe: 1913- ; Economic History: Transport, Trade, Energy, Technology, and Other Services: Europe: 1913-
• Subject: media ; governance ; minority shareholders ; control premium ; corruption ; interwar ; France ; Mediensektor ; Corporate Governance ; Eigentümerstruktur ; Korruption ; Geschichte ; Frankreich ; Großbritannien

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bignon, Vincent ; Flandreau, Marc
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
• (where): Geneva
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/77471
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET