The seniority structure of sovereign debt

Arbeitspapier

Sovereign governments owe debt to many foreign creditors and can choose which creditors to favor when making payments. This paper documents the de facto seniority structure of sovereign debt using new data on defaults (missed payments or arrears) and creditor losses in debt restructuring (haircuts). We overturn conventional wisdom by showing that official bilateral (government-to-government) debt is junior, or at least not senior, to private sovereign debt such as bank loans and bonds. Private creditors are typically paid first and lose less than bilateral official creditors. We confirm that multilateral institutions like the IMF and World Bank are senior creditors.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 2129

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: Sovereign default ; Arrears ; Insolvency ; Priority ; IMF ; Official Debt ; Sovereign bonds ; International Financial Architecture ; Pecking Order

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Schlegl, Matthias ; Trebesch, Christoph ; Wright, Mark L. J.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
• (wo): Kiel
• (wann): 2019

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202326
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 09.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ