Arbeitspapier
The Impact of Public Subsidies on Venture Capital Investments in Start-Up Enterprises
The relationship between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur is modeled to investigate the impact of public subsidies on venture capital investments in start-up enterprises. In this model, the venture capitalist only finances start-up enterprises if he has sufficient expertise to make high-risk investments in new technology profitable in terms of their expected value. It is shown that a venture capitalist who already has sufficient expertise reduces his management support in the start-up enterprise under a public subsidy. Moreover, venture capitalists who do not have sufficient expertise may finance start-up enterprises if future losses of the start-up investment are partly covered by the government.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 1018
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Subject
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venture capital
double-sided moral hazard
public subsidies
start-up investments
Risikokapital
Unternehmensgründung
Investition
Finanzierung
Investitionspolitik
Subvention
Moral Hazard
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Schertler, Andrea
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW)
- (where)
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Kiel
- (when)
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2000
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Schertler, Andrea
- Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW)
Time of origin
- 2000