Arbeitspapier

The Impact of Public Subsidies on Venture Capital Investments in Start-Up Enterprises

The relationship between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur is modeled to investigate the impact of public subsidies on venture capital investments in start-up enterprises. In this model, the venture capitalist only finances start-up enterprises if he has sufficient expertise to make high-risk investments in new technology profitable in terms of their expected value. It is shown that a venture capitalist who already has sufficient expertise reduces his management support in the start-up enterprise under a public subsidy. Moreover, venture capitalists who do not have sufficient expertise may finance start-up enterprises if future losses of the start-up investment are partly covered by the government.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 1018

Classification
Wirtschaft
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Subject
venture capital
double-sided moral hazard
public subsidies
start-up investments
Risikokapital
Unternehmensgründung
Investition
Finanzierung
Investitionspolitik
Subvention
Moral Hazard
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schertler, Andrea
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW)
(where)
Kiel
(when)
2000

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Schertler, Andrea
  • Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW)

Time of origin

  • 2000

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