Artikel
An N-person war of attrition with the possibility of a non-compromising type
This paper studies an N-person war of attrition which needs one exit for its ending. An N-person war of attrition is qualitatively different from its two-person version. Only in the former, the set of players who are actively engaged in a war of attrition may change over time. We introduce the possibility of a non-compromising type and characterize the unique equilibrium by identifying which players are actively involved in a war of attrition at each moment. We examine who is likely to exit and when the war of attrition ends quickly. As the leading example, we study how a group selects a volunteer in a dynamic setting.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 14 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 849-886 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Subject
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War of attrition
unique equilibrium
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Kambe, Shinsuke
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
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New Haven, CT
- (when)
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2019
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE3158
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Kambe, Shinsuke
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2019
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The War of Attrition under Uncertainty: Theory and Robust Testable Implications
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