Uniform and nonuniform staggering of wage contracts

Arbeitspapier

This paper provides a model that can account for the almost uniform staggering of wage contracts in some countries as well as for the markedly nonuniform staggering in others. In the model, short and long contracts as well as long contracts concluded in different periods are strategic substitutes, which provides a powerful rationale for staggering. We show that for realistic parameter values, there is a continuum of possible equilibria with various degrees of staggering of long contracts. If the contracting cost is not too large, then the lowest possible degree of staggering decreases with the contracting cost and increases with monetary uncertainty.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5023

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Price Level; Inflation; Deflation ; Business Fluctuations; Cycles ; Labor Contracts
• Subject: Uniform staggering ; nonuniform staggering ; monetary policy shocks ; strategic substitutability ; wage contracts ; contract duration ; Lohn ; Arbeitsvertrag ; Dauer ; Lohnverhandlungstheorie ; Spieltheorie ; Substitutionseffekt ; Geldpolitik ; Schock ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Danziger, Leif
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36979
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET