Arbeitspapier

Stable Allocations of Risk

Measuring risk can be axiomatized by the concept of coherent measures of risk. A risk environment specifies some individual portfolios' realization vectors and a coherent measure of risk. We consider sharing the risk of the aggregate portfolio by studying transferable utility cooperative games: risk allocation games. We show that the class of risk allocation games coincides with the class of totally balanced games. As a limit case the aggregate portfolio can have the same payoff in all states of nature. We prove that the class of risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty coincides with the class of exact games.

ISBN
978-963-9796-01-0
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2007/4

Classification
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Subject
Coherent Measures of Risk
Risk Allocation Games
Totally Balanced Games
Exact Games
Risiko
Messung
Spieltheorie
Transferierbarer Nutzen
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Csóka, Péter
Herings, Jean-Jacques
Kóczy, László Á.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
(where)
Budapest
(when)
2007

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Csóka, Péter
  • Herings, Jean-Jacques
  • Kóczy, László Á.
  • Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2007

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