Arbeitspapier

Trade, Trust And The Territoriality Of The Law

In this paper we analyze whether trust can overcome the contractual hazards caused by the territoriality of law, how effective trust is and what the impact is on the sequential structure of trade. The paper contributes to the New Institutional Economics of International Transactions (NIEIT).

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CSLE Discussion Paper ; No. 97-05

Classification
Wirtschaft
Contract Law
Noncooperative Games
Subject
international contract enforcment
trust game
bounded rationality
Vertragsrecht
Nationalstaat
Internationales Handelsrecht
Außenwirtschaft
Vertrauen
Spieltheorie
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schmidtchen, Dieter
Neunzig, Alexander R.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)
(where)
Saarbrücken
(when)
1997

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Schmidtchen, Dieter
  • Neunzig, Alexander R.
  • Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)

Time of origin

  • 1997

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