Arbeitspapier

The efficient provision of public goods through non-distortionary tax contests

We use a simple balanced budget contest to collect taxes on a private good in order to ?nance a pure public good. We show that-with an appropriately chosen structure of winning probabilities-this contest can provide the public good efficiently and without distorting private consumption. We provide extensions to multiple public goods and private taxation sources, asymmetric preferences, and show the mechanism's robustness across these settings.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 352

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Taxation
Contests
Efficiency
Öffentliche Güter
Versorgung
Spieltheorie
Finanzierung
Steuerwettbewerb
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Giebe, Thomas
Schweinzer, Paul
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(where)
München
(when)
2011

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13202
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13202-2
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Giebe, Thomas
  • Schweinzer, Paul
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Time of origin

  • 2011

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