Arbeitspapier

The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public goods experiments

Belief elicitation is an important methodological issue for experimental economists. There are two generic questions: 1) Do incentives increase belief accuracy? 2) Are there interaction effects of beliefs and decisions? We investigate these questions in the case of finitely repeated public goods experiments. We find that belief accuracy is significantly higher when beliefs are incentivized. The relationship between contributions and beliefs is slightly steeper under incentives. However, we find that incentivized beliefs tend to lead to higher contribution levels than either non-incentivized beliefs or no beliefs at all. We discuss the implications of our results for the design of public good experiments.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2010-12

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: General
Thema
incentives
beliefs
experimental methodology
public goods
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Meinung
Entscheidung
Öffentliches Gut
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gächter, Simon
Renner, Elke
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
(wo)
Nottingham
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gächter, Simon
  • Renner, Elke
  • The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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