Arbeitspapier
The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public goods experiments
Belief elicitation is an important methodological issue for experimental economists. There are two generic questions: 1) Do incentives increase belief accuracy? 2) Are there interaction effects of beliefs and decisions? We investigate these questions in the case of finitely repeated public goods experiments. We find that belief accuracy is significantly higher when beliefs are incentivized. The relationship between contributions and beliefs is slightly steeper under incentives. However, we find that incentivized beliefs tend to lead to higher contribution levels than either non-incentivized beliefs or no beliefs at all. We discuss the implications of our results for the design of public good experiments.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2010-12
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: General
- Thema
-
incentives
beliefs
experimental methodology
public goods
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Meinung
Entscheidung
Öffentliches Gut
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gächter, Simon
Renner, Elke
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
- (wo)
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Nottingham
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gächter, Simon
- Renner, Elke
- The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
Entstanden
- 2010