Competitive Screening in Insurance Markets with Endogenous Labor Supply

Arbeitspapier

We examine equilibria in competitive insurance markets when individuals take unobservable labor supply decisions. Precautionary labor motives introduce countervailing incentives in the insurance market, and equilibria with positive profits can occur even in the standard case in which individuals exogenously differ in risk only. We then extend the model to allow for both privately known risks and labor productivities. This endogenously introduces two-dimensional heterogeneity in the insurance market since precautionary labor effects lead to differences in income and hence risk aversion. Under these circumstances, separating and pooling equilibria exist, which generally differ from those with exogenous two-dimensional heterogeneity considered by the existing literature. Notably, in contrast to standard screening models, profits may be increasing with insurance coverage, and the correlation between risk and coverage can be zero or negative in equilibrium, a phenomenon frequently observed in empirical studies.

Show object

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 614

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Time Allocation and Labor Supply ; Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: Insurance Markets ; Adverse Selection ; Precautionary Labor ; Versicherungsmarkt ; Arbeitsangebot ; Adverse Selection ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Netzer, Nick ; Scheuer, Florian
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18507