Arbeitspapier

Knight Fever: Towards an Economics of Awards

Awards in the form of orders, medals, decorations and titles are ubiquitous in monarchies and republics, private organizations, not-for-profit and profit-oriented firms. Nevertheless, economists have disregarded this kind of non-material extrinsic incentive. The demand for awards relies on an individual's desire for distinction, and the supply of awards on the provision of incentives. Relative price and income effects are shown to be identifiable and strong. A number of empirically testable propositions are formulated. As awards are (at least so far) impossible to measure adequately, empirical tests are carried out using the technique of analytic narratives.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CREMA Working Paper ; No. 2005-12

Classification
Wirtschaft
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
Subject
Incentives
motivation
awards
orders
distinction
principal-agent

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Frey, Bruno S.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
(where)
Basel
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Frey, Bruno S.
  • Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)

Time of origin

  • 2005

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