Arbeitspapier
Knight Fever: Towards an Economics of Awards
Awards in the form of orders, medals, decorations and titles are ubiquitous in monarchies and republics, private organizations, not-for-profit and profit-oriented firms. Nevertheless, economists have disregarded this kind of non-material extrinsic incentive. The demand for awards relies on an individual's desire for distinction, and the supply of awards on the provision of incentives. Relative price and income effects are shown to be identifiable and strong. A number of empirically testable propositions are formulated. As awards are (at least so far) impossible to measure adequately, empirical tests are carried out using the technique of analytic narratives.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CREMA Working Paper ; No. 2005-12
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
- Subject
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Incentives
motivation
awards
orders
distinction
principal-agent
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Frey, Bruno S.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
- (where)
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Basel
- (when)
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2005
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Frey, Bruno S.
- Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
Time of origin
- 2005