Arbeitspapier
Surprising Selection Effects in the UK Car Insurance Market
We document a large and persistent anomaly in the UK car insurance market over the period 2012-13: insurance companies charged a higher premium for third-party (liability) insurance than comprehensive insurance (which includes third-party). Furthermore, some companies charged higher prices for comprehensive policies with larger deductibles. This evidence suggests both that consumers are too confused or too poorly informed to arbitrage and that sellers of car insurance do not implement the incentive-compatibility constraints at the heart of the adverse-selection model of insurance. This particular insurance market is much less sophisticated than that characterised by modern microeconomic theory.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 8172
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- Thema
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car insurance
adverse selection
bounded rationality
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Cannon, Edmund
Cipriani, Giam Pietro
Bazar-Rosen, Katia
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
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Bonn
- (wann)
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2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Cannon, Edmund
- Cipriani, Giam Pietro
- Bazar-Rosen, Katia
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2014