Arbeitspapier

Surprising Selection Effects in the UK Car Insurance Market

We document a large and persistent anomaly in the UK car insurance market over the period 2012-13: insurance companies charged a higher premium for third-party (liability) insurance than comprehensive insurance (which includes third-party). Furthermore, some companies charged higher prices for comprehensive policies with larger deductibles. This evidence suggests both that consumers are too confused or too poorly informed to arbitrage and that sellers of car insurance do not implement the incentive-compatibility constraints at the heart of the adverse-selection model of insurance. This particular insurance market is much less sophisticated than that characterised by modern microeconomic theory.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 8172

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
Thema
car insurance
adverse selection
bounded rationality

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Cannon, Edmund
Cipriani, Giam Pietro
Bazar-Rosen, Katia
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Cannon, Edmund
  • Cipriani, Giam Pietro
  • Bazar-Rosen, Katia
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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