Arbeitspapier

On the Robustness of Social Norm Elicitation

We study the robustness of Krupka and Weber's method (2013) for eliciting social norms. In two experiments with more than 1200 participants, we find that participants' response patterns are invariant to differences in the salience of the monetarily incentivized coordination aspect. We further demonstrate that asking participants for their personal first and second order beliefs without monetary incentives results in qualitatively identical responses. In addition, we observe that participants give sensible responses whether or not they understand the task or their monetary incentives. Overall, Krupka and Weber's method produces remarkably robust response patterns.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2021-02

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: General
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
Subject
social norms
incentives
beliefs
task comprehension
robustness

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
König-Kersting, Christian
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon)
(where)
Innsbruck
(when)
2021

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • König-Kersting, Christian
  • University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon)

Time of origin

  • 2021

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