Why plaintiffs' attorneys use contingent and defense attorneys fixed fee contracts

Arbeitspapier

Victims want to collect damages from injurers. Cases differ with respect to the judgment. Attorneys observe the expected judgment, clients do not. Victims need an attorney to sue; defense attorneys reduce the probability that the plaintiff prevails. Plaintiffs' attorneys offer contingent fees providing incentives to proceed with strong and drop weak cases. By contrast, defense attorneys work for fixed fees under which they accept all cases. Since the defense commits to fight all cases, few victims sue in the first place. We thus explain the fact that in the US virtually all plaintiffs use contingency while defendants tend to rely exclusively on fixed fees.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 13-06

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Litigation Process
• Thema: litigation ; contingent fees ; fixed fees ; expert services ; Zivilprozess ; Rechtsberufe ; Honorar ; Vergütungssystem ; USA

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Emons, Winand ; Fluet, Claude
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Bern, Department of Economics
• (wo): Bern
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/103849
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ