Arbeitspapier
Social welfare and coercion in public finance
This paper develops an expanded framework for social planning in which the existence of coercion is explicitly acknowledged. Key issues concern the precise definition of coercion for individuals and in the aggregate, its difference from redistribution, and its incorporation into normative analysis. We explore modifications to traditional rules for optimal fiscal policy in the presence of coercion constraints and determine the degree of coercion implied by traditional social planning. The paper maps the trade-off between social welfare and aggregate coercion and explores its implications for normative policy and the comparative evaluation of institutions, including competitive democracy.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2482
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Structure and Scope of Government: General
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- Thema
-
Coercion
redistribution
social planning
optimal fiscal policy
marginal cost of funds
public goods
collective choice
Sozialpolitik
Öffentliches Gut
Einkommensteuerpolitik
Public Choice
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Winer, Stanley L.
Tridimas, George
Hettich, Walter
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
2025-03-10T11:42:28+0100
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Winer, Stanley L.
- Tridimas, George
- Hettich, Walter
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2008