Arbeitspapier

Social welfare and coercion in public finance

This paper develops an expanded framework for social planning in which the existence of coercion is explicitly acknowledged. Key issues concern the precise definition of coercion for individuals and in the aggregate, its difference from redistribution, and its incorporation into normative analysis. We explore modifications to traditional rules for optimal fiscal policy in the presence of coercion constraints and determine the degree of coercion implied by traditional social planning. The paper maps the trade-off between social welfare and aggregate coercion and explores its implications for normative policy and the comparative evaluation of institutions, including competitive democracy.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2482

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Structure and Scope of Government: General
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Thema
Coercion
redistribution
social planning
optimal fiscal policy
marginal cost of funds
public goods
collective choice
Sozialpolitik
Öffentliches Gut
Einkommensteuerpolitik
Public Choice
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Winer, Stanley L.
Tridimas, George
Hettich, Walter
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
2025-03-10T11:42:28+0100

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Winer, Stanley L.
  • Tridimas, George
  • Hettich, Walter
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2008

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