Arbeitspapier

Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties

The nonexistence of equilibria in models of electoral competition involving multiple issues is one of the more puzzling results in political economics. In this paper, we relax the standard assumption that parties act as expected utility maximizers. We show that equilibria often exist when parties with limited knowledge about the electorate are modeled as uncertainty-averse. What is more, these equilibria can be characterized as a straightforward generalization of the classical median voter result.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2010,22

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Subject
Uncertainty Aversion
Multiple Priors
Median Voter
Electoral Competition over many Issues
Wahlkampf
Politische Partei
Risikoaversion
Median Voter
Gleichgewicht
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bade, Sophie
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2010

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Bade, Sophie
  • Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Time of origin

  • 2010

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