Arbeitspapier
Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties
The nonexistence of equilibria in models of electoral competition involving multiple issues is one of the more puzzling results in political economics. In this paper, we relax the standard assumption that parties act as expected utility maximizers. We show that equilibria often exist when parties with limited knowledge about the electorate are modeled as uncertainty-averse. What is more, these equilibria can be characterized as a straightforward generalization of the classical median voter result.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2010,22
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- Subject
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Uncertainty Aversion
Multiple Priors
Median Voter
Electoral Competition over many Issues
Wahlkampf
Politische Partei
Risikoaversion
Median Voter
Gleichgewicht
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Bade, Sophie
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (where)
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Bonn
- (when)
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2010
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Bade, Sophie
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Time of origin
- 2010