Arbeitspapier
Too Few Cooks Spoil the Broth: Division of Labour and Directed Production
How can a manager influence workers' activity while knowing little about it? This paper examines a situation where production requires several tasks, and the manager wants to direct production to achieve a preferred allocation of effort across tasks. However, the effort that is required for each task cannot be observed, and the production result is the only indicator of worker activity. This paper illustrates that in this situation, the manager cannot implement the preferred allocation with a single worker. On the other hand, the manager is able to implement the preferred allocation by inducing a game among several workers. Gains to workers from collusion may be eliminated by an ability-dependent, but potentially inefficient, task assignment. These findings provide a new explanation for the division of labor, and bureaucratic features such as "over"-specialization and "wrong" task allocation.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion Paper Series ; No. 468
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Economics of Contract: Theory
Personnel Economics: Labor Management
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Organization of Production
Labor Demand
- Subject
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specialization
job design
moral hazard
multitasking
Arbeitsteilung
Arbeitsgestaltung
Moral Hazard
Arbeitsleistung
Extensives Spiel
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Ratto, Marisa
Schnedler, Wendelin
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Heidelberg
- (when)
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2008
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Ratto, Marisa
- Schnedler, Wendelin
- University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2008