Arbeitspapier

State fragility, rent seeking and lobbying: evidence from African data

This paper assesses the determinants of state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa using hitherto unexplored variables in the literature. The previously missing dimension of nation building is integrated and the hypothesis of state fragility being a function of rent seeking and/or lobbying by de facto power holders is tested. The resulting interesting finding is that, political interference, rent seeking and lobbying increase the probability of state fragility by mitigating the effectiveness of governance capacity. This relationship (after controlling for a range of economic, institutional and demographic factors) is consistent with a plethora of models and specifications. The validity of the hypothesis is confirmed in a scenario of extreme state fragility. Moreover, the interaction between political interferences and revolutions mitigate the probability of state fragility while the interaction between natural resources and political interferences breeds the probability of extreme state fragility. As a policy implication, there is a 'sub-Saharan African specificity' in 'nation building' and prevention of conflicts. Blanket fragility oriented policies will be misplaced unless they are contingent on the degree of fragility, since 'fragile' and 'extreme fragile' countries respond differently to economic, institutional and demographic characteristics of state fragility.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: AGDI Working Paper ; No. WP/13/019

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Index Numbers and Aggregation; Leading indicators
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Development Planning and Policy: General
Institutions and Growth
Economywide Country Studies: Africa
Thema
State fragility
rent seeking
lobbying
nation building
Africa

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Asongu, Simplice A.
Kodila-Tedika, Oasis
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
African Governance and Development Institute (AGDI)
(wo)
Yaoundé
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Asongu, Simplice A.
  • Kodila-Tedika, Oasis
  • African Governance and Development Institute (AGDI)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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