Arbeitspapier
R&D incentives in vertically related markets
This paper focuses on incentives to invest in research and development (R&D) in vertically related markets. In a bilateral duopoly setup, we consider how process R&D incentives of the firms in both upstream and downstream market depend on the intensity of simultaneous interbrand and intrabrand competition. Among the results: both interbrand and intrabrand competition have twofold effects on R&D incentives. Existence of a vertically related market with imperfect competition lowers both the incentives to invest in process R&D and the competitive advantage through the R&D investment. We will show how the impact of a firm's R&D investments in either market on consumer surplus as well as on the profits of all firms in both markets depends on exogenous parameters.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 07-2013
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights: General
- Thema
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research and development
vertical relations
bilateral oligopoly
product differentiation
process innovation
interbrand and intrabrand competition
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Memar, Ahmad Reza Saboori
Götz, Georg
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
- (wo)
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Marburg
- (wann)
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2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Memar, Ahmad Reza Saboori
- Götz, Georg
- Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
Entstanden
- 2013