Arbeitspapier

R&D incentives in vertically related markets

This paper focuses on incentives to invest in research and development (R&D) in vertically related markets. In a bilateral duopoly setup, we consider how process R&D incentives of the firms in both upstream and downstream market depend on the intensity of simultaneous interbrand and intrabrand competition. Among the results: both interbrand and intrabrand competition have twofold effects on R&D incentives. Existence of a vertically related market with imperfect competition lowers both the incentives to invest in process R&D and the competitive advantage through the R&D investment. We will show how the impact of a firm's R&D investments in either market on consumer surplus as well as on the profits of all firms in both markets depends on exogenous parameters.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 07-2013

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights: General
Thema
research and development
vertical relations
bilateral oligopoly
product differentiation
process innovation
interbrand and intrabrand competition

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Memar, Ahmad Reza Saboori
Götz, Georg
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
(wo)
Marburg
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Memar, Ahmad Reza Saboori
  • Götz, Georg
  • Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics

Entstanden

  • 2013

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