Arbeitspapier
When queueing is better than push and shove
We address the scheduling problem of reordering an existing queue into its efficient order through trade. To that end, we consider individually rational and balanced budget direct and indirect mechanisms. We show that this class of mechanisms allows us to form efficient queues provided that existing property rights for the service are small enough to enable trade between the agents. In particular, we show on the one hand that no queue under a fully deterministic service schedule such as first-come, first-serve can be dissolved efficiently and meet our requirements. If, on the other hand, the alternative is service anarchy (ie. a random queue), every existing queue can be transformed into an efficient order.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 144
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
Scheduling
Queueing
Mechanism design
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gershkov, Alex
Schweinzer, Paul
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2006
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13407
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13407-0
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gershkov, Alex
- Schweinzer, Paul
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2006
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