Injunctions against false advertising

Konferenzbeitrag

We consider a situation of duopolistic competition in which one firm may (falsely) advertise high product quality. Consumers are heterogeneous. One group forms rational beliefs about quality, whereas some consumers are naive and fully trust any advertisement. We compare two scenarios in which either the competitor or a government agency can file an injunction suit. From a welfare perspective, we show that it may be optimal either to have the competitor or the government agency as plaintiff.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Marketing ; No. G12-V2

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Litigation Process ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Baumann, Florian ; Rasch, Alexander
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (where): Kiel, Hamburg
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168142