Arbeitspapier

Credit ratings and structured finance

The poor performance of credit ratings of structured finance products in the financial crisis has prompted investigation into the role of credit rating agencies (CRAs) in designing and marketing these products. We analyze a two-period reputation model in which a CRA both designs and rates securities that are sold both to investors who require highly rated securities and investors who are unconstrained. Assets are pooled and senior and junior tranches are issued with a waterfall structure. When rating standards are low, the CRA will include only risky assets in the securitization pool, serving both types of investors without any rating inflation. Rating inflation may be non-monotonic in rating standards, with no rating inflation when rating standards are low and high.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 1236

Classification
Wirtschaft
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Subject
Credit rating agencies
Reputation
Structured finance

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Josephson, Jens
Shapiro, Joel Andrew
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
(where)
Stockholm
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Josephson, Jens
  • Shapiro, Joel Andrew
  • Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Time of origin

  • 2018

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