Arbeitspapier

Firms’ rationales for CEO duality: Evidence from a mandatory disclosure regulation

Exploiting the 2009 amendments to Regulation S-K, we provide unique evidence on the first-time disclosure of the reasons firms state for combining (separating) the roles of CEO and chairman. The stated reasons support both agency theory and organization theory. They are more numerous and comprise more words, including more positive words, for firms with duality. Examining the announcement returns to firms' disclosures, we find that investors evaluate the most frequently cited reasons for CEO duality by considering the firm's characteristics.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CFR Working Paper ; No. 18-06

Classification
Wirtschaft
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation
Subject
CEO Duality
Board of Directors
Corporate Governance
Regulation S-K
Textual Analysis

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Goergen, Marc
Limbach, Peter
Scholz-Daneshgari, Meik
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)
(where)
Cologne
(when)
2019

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Goergen, Marc
  • Limbach, Peter
  • Scholz-Daneshgari, Meik
  • University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)

Time of origin

  • 2019

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