Arbeitspapier

No exit from the joint decision trap? Can German federalism reform itself?

The unique institutions that make up Germany's unitary federal state, long considered part of the country's post-war success story, are now generally perceived as a joint-decision trap impeding effective policy responses to new economic and demographic challenges at both levels of government. Nevertheless, a high-powered bicameral Commission set up in the fall of 2003 failed to reach agreement on constitutional reforms. The paper analyzes the misguided procedural and substantive choices that led to this failure, and it discusses the possibility of asymmetric constitutional solutions that might enhance the capacity for autonomous action at both levels.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: MPIfG Working Paper ; No. 05/8

Classification
Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie, Anthropologie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Scharpf, Fritz W.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
(where)
Cologne
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Scharpf, Fritz W.
  • Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies

Time of origin

  • 2005

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