Artikel
Incentive magnitude effects in experimental games: Bigger is not necessarily better
In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their strategy choices and the consequent outcomes of the games. Limited evidence exists regarding incentive magnitude effects in experimental games. We examined one-off strategy choices and self-reported reasons for choices in eight 3 × 3 and four 4 × 4 normal-form games under task-related incentives of conventional magnitude and compared them with choices and reasons in the same games under incentives five times as large. Both strategy choices and self-reported reasons for choices were almost indistinguishable between the two conditions. These results are in line with earlier findings on individual decision making and with a parametric model, in which the incentive elasticity of effort is very small when compared with other factors, such as the complexity of the decision problem.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 9 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-10 ; Basel: MDPI
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: General
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- Subject
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capital-labor-production framework
crowding out
experimental games
incentives
incentive elasticity of effort
reasons for choices
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Pulford, Briony D.
Colman, Andrew M.
Loomes, Graham
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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MDPI
- (where)
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Basel
- (when)
-
2018
- DOI
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doi:10.3390/g9010004
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Pulford, Briony D.
- Colman, Andrew M.
- Loomes, Graham
- MDPI
Time of origin
- 2018
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