Artikel

On costless‐renegotiation proofing in binary agency models

This paper analyzes the occurrence of renegotiation costs in dynamic, binary agency models with a risk‐averse agent. I investigate technological interdependence arising from complementary tasks or substitutable tasks across periods. In addition, I analyze stochastic interdependence between periods. The analysis leads to two results. First, the timeliness of performance measures leads to zero costs from renegotiation. Surprisingly, timeliness may arise even in the case of stochastic interdependence. Second, neither technological nor stochastic interdependence is sufficient for renegotiation losses. The former finding is in line with results obtained in the LEN model, but the latter contrasts. In the binary agency model, renegotiation does not harm efficiency as long as raising incentives in the second period is ineffective for inducing higher effort in the first period.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Managerial and Decision Economics ; ISSN: 1099-1468 ; Volume: 44 ; Year: 2023 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 2481-2494 ; Hoboken, NJ: Wiley

Classification
Management

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Lukas, Christian
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wiley
(where)
Hoboken, NJ
(when)
2023

DOI
doi:10.1002/mde.3829
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Lukas, Christian
  • Wiley

Time of origin

  • 2023

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