Arbeitspapier
Media market concentration, advertising levels, and ad prices
Standard media economics models imply that increased platform competition decreases ad levels and that mergers reduce per-viewer ad prices. The empirical evidence, however, is mixed. We attribute the theoretical predictions to the combined assumptions that there is no advertising congestion and that viewers single-home. Allowing for crowding in viewer attention spans for ads may reverse standard results, as does allowing viewers to multi-home.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3677
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Consumer Economics: Theory
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Thema
-
media economics
pricing ads
advertising clutter
information congestion
mergers, entry
Medienwirtschaft
Wirtschaftskonzentration
Bottleneck
Werbung
Betriebliche Preispolitik
Medienökonomik
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Anderson, Simon P.
Foros, Oystein
Kind, Hans Jarle
Peitz, Martin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Anderson, Simon P.
- Foros, Oystein
- Kind, Hans Jarle
- Peitz, Martin
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2011