Media market concentration, advertising levels, and ad prices

Arbeitspapier

Standard media economics models imply that increased platform competition decreases ad levels and that mergers reduce per-viewer ad prices. The empirical evidence, however, is mixed. We attribute the theoretical predictions to the combined assumptions that there is no advertising congestion and that viewers single-home. Allowing for crowding in viewer attention spans for ads may reverse standard results, as does allowing viewers to multi-home.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3677

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Consumer Economics: Theory ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Subject: media economics ; pricing ads ; advertising clutter ; information congestion ; mergers, entry ; Medienwirtschaft ; Wirtschaftskonzentration ; Bottleneck ; Werbung ; Betriebliche Preispolitik ; Medienökonomik ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Anderson, Simon P. ; Foros, Oystein ; Kind, Hans Jarle ; Peitz, Martin
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2011

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54928
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET