Arbeitspapier

Price disclosure rules and consumer price comparison

Search frictions are regarded as a major impediment to active competition in many markets. In some markets, such as financial and retail gasoline, governments and consumer protection agencies call for compulsory price reporting. Consumers could then more easily compare the firms' offers. We showthat for a given level of price comparison, mandatory price reporting indeed generally benefits consumers. Such regulation, however, feeds back into firms' strategies, resulting in lower levels of price comparison in equilibrium. This effect may dominate so that the regulation lead to higher expected market prices.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CAWM Discussion Paper ; No. 74

Classification
Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Economics of Regulation
Subject
Mixed Strategies
Price Comparison
Regulation

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Stühmeier, Torben
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Centrum für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (CAWM)
(where)
Münster
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Stühmeier, Torben
  • Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Centrum für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (CAWM)

Time of origin

  • 2014

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