Arbeitspapier
The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information
The type-agent core is a new solution concept for exchange economies with asymmetric information. It coincides with the set of equilibrium outcomes of a simple competitive screening game. Uninformed intermediaries help the agents to cooperate in an attempt to make some profit. The paper extends the work of Perez-Castrillo (1994) to exchange economies with non-transferable utility and asymmetric information. The type-agent core is a subset of Wilson (1978)’s coarse core. It is never empty, even though it may be a strict subset of Wilson’s fine core. In addition, it converges towards the set of constrained market equilibria as the economy is replicated.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2004-18
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Tauschwirtschaft
Asymmetrische Information
Core
Sunspot
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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de Clippel, Geoffroy
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Brown University, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Providence, RI
- (when)
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2004
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- de Clippel, Geoffroy
- Brown University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2004
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