Arbeitspapier

Effectiveness of Hedging Strategies under Model Misspecification and Trading Restrictions

We consider a standard two-player all-pay auction with private values, where the valuation for the object is private information to each bidder. The crucial feature is that one bidder is favored by the allocation rule in the sense that he need not bid as much as the other bidder to win the auction. Analogously, the other bidder is handicapped by the rule as overbidding the rival may not be enough to win the auction. Clearly, this has important implications on equilibrium behavior. We fully characterize the equilibrium strategies for this auction format and show that there exists a unique pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 13/2002

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing; option pricing
Thema
Incomplete markets
model misspecification
trading restrictions
hedging
super-hedging
martingale measure
duplication costs
Optionspreistheorie
Hedging
Strategie
Modell-Spezifikation
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dudenhausen, Antje
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dudenhausen, Antje
  • University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Entstanden

  • 2002

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