Arbeitspapier

The ignored performance measure

This paper studies a setting in which a risk averse agent must be motivated to work on two tasks: he (1) evaluates a new project and, if adopted, (2) manages it. While a performance measure which is informative of an agent´s action is typically valuable because it can be used to improve the risk sharing of the contract, this is not necessarily the case in this two-task setting. I provide a sufficient condition under which a performance measure that is informative of the second task is worthless for contracting despite the agent being risk averse. This shows that information content is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a performance measure to be valuable.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper Series: Finance & Accounting ; No. 117

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Leistungsbeurteilung
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Anreizvertrag
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Laux, Volker
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2003

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-15245
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Laux, Volker
  • Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Time of origin

  • 2003

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