Arbeitspapier
The ignored performance measure
This paper studies a setting in which a risk averse agent must be motivated to work on two tasks: he (1) evaluates a new project and, if adopted, (2) manages it. While a performance measure which is informative of an agent´s action is typically valuable because it can be used to improve the risk sharing of the contract, this is not necessarily the case in this two-task setting. I provide a sufficient condition under which a performance measure that is informative of the second task is worthless for contracting despite the agent being risk averse. This shows that information content is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a performance measure to be valuable.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper Series: Finance & Accounting ; No. 117
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Leistungsbeurteilung
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Anreizvertrag
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Laux, Volker
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften
- (where)
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Frankfurt a. M.
- (when)
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2003
- Handle
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-15245
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Laux, Volker
- Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Time of origin
- 2003