Arbeitspapier
Demystifying the 'metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion'
In a recent book and earlier studies, Donald Saari well clarifies the source of three classical impossibility theorems in social choice and proposes possible escape out of these negative results. The objective of this note is to illustrate the relevance of these explanations in justifying the metric approach to the social compromise with the unanimity criterion.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2009-18
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Thema
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social choice
impossibility theorems
metric approach to compromise with the unanimity criterion
Unmöglichkeitstheorem
Theorie
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Nitzan, Shmuel
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Ramat-Gan
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Nitzan, Shmuel
- Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2009