Arbeitspapier

Demystifying the 'metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion'

In a recent book and earlier studies, Donald Saari well clarifies the source of three classical impossibility theorems in social choice and proposes possible escape out of these negative results. The objective of this note is to illustrate the relevance of these explanations in justifying the metric approach to the social compromise with the unanimity criterion.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2009-18

Classification
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Subject
social choice
impossibility theorems
metric approach to compromise with the unanimity criterion
Unmöglichkeitstheorem
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Nitzan, Shmuel
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
(where)
Ramat-Gan
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Nitzan, Shmuel
  • Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2009

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