Contests with Rank-Order Spillovers

Arbeitspapier

This paper presents a unified framework for characterizing symmetric equilibrium in simultaneous move, two-player, rank-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine spillover effects that depend on the rank-order of her decision variable. These effects arise in natural interpretations of a number of important economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where individuals exhibit inequality aversion or regret. We provide the closed-form solution for the symmetric Nash equilibria of this class of games, and show how it can be used to directly solve for equilibrium behavior in auctions, pricing games, tournaments, R&D races, models of ligitation, and a host of other contests.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 09-066/2

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Auctions ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
• Subject: Contests ; Auctions ; Spillovers ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Vollkommene Information ; Spillover-Effekt ; Auktionstheorie ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Baye, Michael R. ; Kovenock, Dan ; de Vries, Casper G.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Tinbergen Institute
• (where): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86783
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET