Arbeitspapier
In the light of dynamic competition: Should we make merger remedies more flexible?
Mergers and acquisitions shape industry competition. Effective merger remedies are important for market efficiency and consumer welfare. This paper explores the need for more flexible remedies to address changing markets after mergers. While the EU permits some flexibility with less restrictive remedies, we conceptually advance the design elements of a dual-phase, bifurcated merger control system. This system integrates ex-ante processes with more systematic and comprehensive ex-post measures. Such an approach can address the shortcomings of the current system and, consequently, holds the potential to enhance merger control in dynamic markets.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 181
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Antitrust Law
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Thema
-
merger remedies
competition authorities
market dynamics
dynamic competition
oligopolies
innovation effects
European Union
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bougette, Patrice
Budzinski, Oliver
Marty, Frédéric
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Technische Universität Ilmenau, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
- (wo)
-
Ilmenau
- (wann)
-
2023
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bougette, Patrice
- Budzinski, Oliver
- Marty, Frédéric
- Technische Universität Ilmenau, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
Entstanden
- 2023
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