Arbeitspapier

Roving bandits in action: Outside option and governmental predation in autocracies

The paper investigates the influence of outside options on the predatory behavior of autocrats. An outside option is referred to as the opportunity of an incumbent ruler to continue his career outside his current territory of control. The paper uses data on the effectiveness of tax collection and the repressiveness of tax jurisprudence for Russian regions in 2007-2009 and finds that regions ruled by governors with substantial outside options are characterized by more repressive behavior of tax authorities. However, surprisingly, the same tax authorities collect less additional revenues for the public budget. It conjectures that the presence of an outside option induces autocrats to behave like roving bandits they use tax audits to establish control over regional companies, but exploit this control to extract private rents rather than revenues for the regional budget used for public goods provision.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series ; No. 190

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Political Economy; Property Rights
Thema
roving and stationary bandit
tax auditing
predatory government
Russian federalism
Finanzverwaltung
Regionalverwaltung
Autoritäres System
Steuerliche Betriebsprüfung
Rent Seeking
Russland

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Libman, Alexander
Kozlov, Vladimir
Schultz, André
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Libman, Alexander
  • Kozlov, Vladimir
  • Schultz, André
  • Frankfurt School of Finance & Management

Entstanden

  • 2012

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