Arbeitspapier
The game of negotiations: Ordering issues and implementing agreements
We use a two-issue bargaining model with asymmetric information to study agent choice of how to structure bargaining. We uncover the settings in which different agenda structures are chosen in equilibrium, how the order in which issues are bargained over matters, and what impact the rules for implementing agreements have. If agreements are implemented as they are reached, 'easy' issues are negotiated first and 'hard' issues later; if agreements are implemented only after all issues are settled, then it is size that matters, with large issues settled first. All parties prefer the former rules of implementation to the latter.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Research Report ; No. 2000-10
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Verhandlungstheorie
Asymmetrische Information
Signalling
Theorie
Ranking-Verfahren
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Busch, Lutz-Alexander
Horstmann, Ignatius J.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
London (Ontario)
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Busch, Lutz-Alexander
- Horstmann, Ignatius J.
- The University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2000