Arbeitspapier

The game of negotiations: Ordering issues and implementing agreements

We use a two-issue bargaining model with asymmetric information to study agent choice of how to structure bargaining. We uncover the settings in which different agenda structures are chosen in equilibrium, how the order in which issues are bargained over matters, and what impact the rules for implementing agreements have. If agreements are implemented as they are reached, 'easy' issues are negotiated first and 'hard' issues later; if agreements are implemented only after all issues are settled, then it is size that matters, with large issues settled first. All parties prefer the former rules of implementation to the latter.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Research Report ; No. 2000-10

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Verhandlungstheorie
Asymmetrische Information
Signalling
Theorie
Ranking-Verfahren

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Busch, Lutz-Alexander
Horstmann, Ignatius J.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics
(wo)
London (Ontario)
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Busch, Lutz-Alexander
  • Horstmann, Ignatius J.
  • The University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2000

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