Arbeitspapier
Deterministic versus Stochastic Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Models
This paper shows that, contrary to what is generally believed, decreasing concavity of the agent's utility function with respect to the screening variable is not sufficient to ensure that stochastic mechanisms are suboptimal. The paper demonstrates, however, that they are suboptimal whenever the optimal deterministic mechanism exhibits no bunching. This is the case for most applications of the theory and therefore validates the literature's usual focus on deterministic mechanisms.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 26
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
principal-agent theory
mechanism design
deterministic mechanisms
randomization
bunching
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Strausz, Roland
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2004
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13522
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13522-8
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Strausz, Roland
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2004
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