Technology diffusion, abatement cost, and transboundary pollution

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies countries' incentives to develop advanced pollution abatement technology when technology may spillover across countries and pollution abatement is a global public good. We are motivated in part by the problem of global warming: a solution to this involves providing a global public good, and will surely require the development and implementation of new technologies. We show that at the Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous-move game with R&D investment and emission abatement, whether the free rider effect prevails and under-investment and excess emissions occur depends on the degree of technology spillovers and the effect of R&D on the marginal abatement costs. There are cases in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, Nash equilibrium investments in emissions reductions exceed the first-best case.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 96.2008

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Environmental Economics: General ; International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods ; Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
• Thema: International Environmental Agreement ; Pollution Abatement Costs ; Endogenous Technological Change

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Tarui, Nori ; Heal, Geoffrey
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (wo): Milano
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53382
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ