Arbeitspapier
On Inequity Aversion - A Reply to Binmore and Shaked
In this paper we reply to Binmore and Shaked's criticism of the Fehr-Schmidt model of inequity aversion. We put the theory and their arguments into perspective and show that their criticism is not substantiated. Finally, we briefly comment on the main challenges for future research on social preferences.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 256
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Economic Methodology
Design of Experiments: General
- Thema
-
Experiments
other-regarding preferences
inequity aversion
Gerechtigkeit
Präferenztheorie
Spieltheorie
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fehr, Ernst
Schmidt, Klaus M.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2009
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13296
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13296-8
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fehr, Ernst
- Schmidt, Klaus M.
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2009
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