Artikel
Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation: The average vote example
The average voting procedure reflects the weighted average of expressed opinions in [0,1]. Participants typically behave strategically. We evaluate the discrepancy between the average taste and the average vote. If the population is sufficiently large, it is possible to construct approximations of both the average vote and the average taste which may be readily compared. We construct upper and lower bounds for the limit average vote that depend on the limit average taste. If the average taste is central enough, the range of possible values for the average voting outcome is narrower than the corresponding range for majority voting. For instance, if the average taste is at 1/2, the limit equilibrium outcome is this value plus or minus roughly .2, whereas the weighted median maybe anywhere in the [0,1] interval.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 2 ; Year: 2011 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 497-513 ; Heidelberg: Springer
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Public Goods
Educational Finance; Financial Aid
- Subject
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average voting
Nash equilibrium
strategic bias
weight
Abstimmungsregel
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Renault, Régis
Trannoy, Alain
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Springer
- (where)
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Heidelberg
- (when)
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2011
- DOI
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doi:10.1007/s13209-011-0077-0
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Renault, Régis
- Trannoy, Alain
- Springer
Time of origin
- 2011
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