Arbeitspapier

A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues

We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no assumptions on preferences. Our method also finds certain partial solutions that may be useful when the core is empty.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 120.2005

Classification
Wirtschaft
Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Subject
Matching markets
Core
Lattice
Gale-Shapley algorithm
Präferenztheorie
Studierende
Hochschule
Theorie
Matching

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Echenique, Federico
Yenmez, Mehmet B.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Echenique, Federico
  • Yenmez, Mehmet B.
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2005

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