Arbeitspapier
A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues
We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no assumptions on preferences. Our method also finds certain partial solutions that may be useful when the core is empty.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 120.2005
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Subject
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Matching markets
Core
Lattice
Gale-Shapley algorithm
Präferenztheorie
Studierende
Hochschule
Theorie
Matching
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Echenique, Federico
Yenmez, Mehmet B.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
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Milano
- (when)
-
2005
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Echenique, Federico
- Yenmez, Mehmet B.
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 2005